This paper studies, for the first time, the trajectory planning problem in adversarial environments, where the objective is to design the trajectory of a robot to reach a desired final state despite the unknown and arbitrary action of an attacker. In particular, we consider a robot moving in a two-dimensional space and equipped with two sensors, namely, a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) sensor and a Radio Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) sensor. The attacker can arbitrarily spoof the readings of the GNSS sensor and the robot control input so as to maximally deviate his trajectory from the nominal precomputed path. We derive explicit and constructive conditions for the existence of undetectable attacks, through which the attacker deviates the robot trajectory in a stealthy way. Conversely, we characterize the existence of secure trajectories, which guarantee that the robot either moves along the nominal trajectory or that the attack remains detectable. We show that secure trajectories can only exist between a subset of states, and provide a numerical mechanism to compute them. We illustrate our findings through several numerical studies, and discuss that our methods are applicable to different models of robot dynamics, including unicycles. More generally, our results show how control design affects security in systems with nonlinear dynamics.
Introduction
Autonomous robots have rapidly been adopted in a broad range of applications, including delivery, exploration, surveillance, and search and rescue. Autonomous robots rely on sensory data to make decisions, plan their trajectories, and apply controls. Yet, as demonstrated by recent studies and real world incidents, sensory data can be accidentally and maliciously compromised, thus undermining the effectiveness of autonomous operations in critical and adversarial applications.
Despite recent advances in understanding and enhancing security of cyber-physical systems, security tools for autonomous systems are still of limited applicability and effectiveness. In this paper we formulate and solve a secure trajectory planning problem, where the objective is to design the trajectory of a robot to reach a desired final state despite unknown and arbitrary attacks. We consider a robot equipped with a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) sensor and a Radio Signal Strength This paper was not presented at any IFAC meeting. Corresponding author: G. Bianchin. This material is based upon work supported in part by ARO award 71603NSYIP, and in part by NSF award CNS-1646641.
Indicator (RSSI) sensor, and focus on attackers capable of simultaneously spoofing the GNSS readings and sending falsified control inputs to the robot. We show how the robot can exploit the RSSI readings, which provide an estimate of a nonlinear function of the state, to reveal certain attacks, how the attacker can generate undetectable attacks that maximally deviate the robot trajectory from the nominal and precomputed path, and how to design secure trajectories between certain subsets of states. We remark that, because of the nonlinearity of RSSI sensor readings, existing security methods based on linear models are inapplicable in our setting. In fact, our results show for the first time that the security of a system with nonlinear dynamics can be improved by appropriately designing its control inputs.
Related work Security of cyber-physical systems is, by now, a widely studied topic across the controls and computer science communities, among others. Yet, most methods are applicable to static systems or systems with linear dynamics [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] , and theoretical results and tools for the security of systems with nonlinear dynamics are still critically lacking. Few exceptions are [6] , which considers the problem of controlling a system under coordinated actuation and deception attacks in a game-theoretic framework, [7] that focuses on nonlinear systems satisfying differentially flatness properties, and the re-cent articles [8, 9] , which are however restricted to particular classes of nonlinear dynamics, to attacks modifying the system measurements only, and to the secure estimation problem. Instead, in this work we focus on characterizing detectability for attacks modifying both the measurements and the input of the system, on quantifying the extent of their perturbation, and on the problem of designing nominal control inputs to restrict or prevent undetectable attacks.
The literature on GNSS spoofing attack mechanisms and their detection is also related to this paper. Existing approaches to identify and prevent spoofing attacks can be divided into two categories: filtering-based and redundancy-based techniques. Filtering-based detection relies on signal processing methods to reveal compromised streams of sensory data; e.g., see [10, 11] . Redundancy-based techniques, instead, rely on the measurement of multiple sensors to reveal inconsistent data; e.g., see [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . The methods developed in this work combine these two principles. In fact, detection is achieved by processing the sensory data over time, thus ensuring compatibility of the measurements with the robot dynamical model, and by processing the measurements of two or more sensors, thus exploiting redundancy across the two channels.
Paper contribution This paper features three main contributions. First, we formulate a secure trajectory planning problem for robots with double-integrator dynamics equipped with GNSS and RSSI sensors. We consider attackers capable of simultaneously spoofing the GNSS measurements and sending arbitrary control inputs to the robot. We explicitly characterize the existence and form of undetectable attacks, that is, coordinated attack inputs that (i) deviate the robot trajectory from the nominal path, and (ii) cannot be detected using the GNSS and RSSI readings. Second, we formulate and solve an optimization problem to design optimal undetectable attacks, which maximally deviate the robot trajectory while maintaining undetectability. Third, we show that secure trajectories exist only between a subset of states, where, independently of the attack, the robot either follows the nominal secure trajectory or readily detects the attack. Additionally, we formulate and solve an optimization problem to design secure trajectories.
As minor contributions, we characterize undetectable attacks and secure trajectories for robots with unicycle dynamics, thus showing that our framework is in fact applicable to different nonlinear dynamical robot models and sensors, and provide illustrative examples highlighting a geometric interpretation of our results. More generally, our results show that secure trajectories can be substantially different from shortest trajectories, and that security in nonlinear systems is a function of the employed control input.
Paper organization The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our problem setup and attack model. Section 3 contains our notion of undetectability and our characterization of undetectable attacks. Section 4 and Section 5 contain, respectively, the design of optimal undetectable attacks and of secure trajectories. Finally, Section 6 contains an extension of our results to the case of robots with unicycle dynamics, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
Problem setup and preliminary notions
We consider a robot with double-integrator dynamics,
where p n : R ≥0 → R 2 denotes the robot position, v n :
R ≥0 → R 2 the robot velocity, and u n : R ≥0 → R 2 the nominal control input that actuates the acceleration of the robot. The control input u n is the design parameter that is used to plan the nominal robot trajectory between two desired configurations. We assume that u n is piecewise continuous, and that
where u max ∈ R >0 . We let the robot be equipped with two noiseless sensors: a GNSS receiver that provides an absolute measure of the position, and a RSSI sensor that provides a measure of the relative distance between the robot and a base station located at the origin of the reference frame. Specifically, the sensor readings are y GNSS n = p n , and y
Although our results can be extended to include different sensors, we focus on GNSS and RSSI sensors because they are available in many practical applications [18] .
We consider scenarios where the robot operates in an adversarial environment, where adversaries can simultaneously (i) spoof the GNSS signal y
GNSS n
, and (ii) compromise the control input u n . The robot dynamics in the presence of attacks are
where u ∈ R 2 denotes the attacked control input that obeys the bound on the maximum acceleration u ≤ u max , and
where u GNSS : R ≥0 → R 2 denotes the GNSS spoofing signal. Finally, we make the practical assumption that, at time t = 0, the nominal and attacked configurations satisfy x n (0) = x(0).
In the remainder of this paper, we will use the quantities x, p, and v interchangeably, depending on the context. In particular, we let
T denote the state, and
Remark 1 (Spoofing attack mechanism) Wellknown vulnerabilities of GNSS are conventionally associated with the lack of appropriate encryption in the signals that are broadcast by the satellite system. A typical framework to cast spoofing attacks consists in a receiver-spoofer antenna [19] that is capable of sensing the authentic GNSS signals and of rebroadcasting falsified streams of information to the robot onboard receiver. The retransmitted signals are typically designed in a way to induce the GNSS receiver to resynchronize with the spoofed information, for instance by gradually increasing the intensity of the retransmission. Once the onboard receiver has resynchronized with the falsified signals, an attacker can arbitrarily decide the GNSS data received by the robot, resulting in (4). A more in-depth discussion of common spoofing schemes and the required hardware can be found in e.g. [19, 20] .
In common mobile robotic applications, robots communicate wirelessly with a ground control station, that is responsible to compute the actions and control inputs to be executed by the robot. The use of wireless communication constitutes a possible vulnerability that can be modeled as in (3) . See [21] for a discussion of common vulnerabilities of wireless communication in commercial Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV).
In this work we consider two problems that formalize the contrasting objectives of an attacker, that is, to deviate the robot trajectory while remaining undetected, and the trajectory planner, that is, to design a trajectory between two configurations that is robust to attacks. We refer to the latter problem to as the secure trajectory planning problem. In particular, the attacker aims to design the attack inputs (u, u GNSS ) so that (i) the deviation between the robot nominal trajectory and the actual (attacked) trajectory is maximized; and (ii) the attack remains undetected (as defined below).
Instead, the secure trajectory planning problem asks for a nominal control input u n to guarantee that (iii) in the absence of attacks, u n allows the robot to reach a desired final state; and (iv) in the presence of attacks, attacks are detectable (see below) by processing the signals u n , y GNSS , and y RSSI .
We remark that, (i) although the problem of trajectory planning has a long history, e.g., see [22] , the problem of designing trajectories in adversarial environments has not been studied before, and (ii) the large body of results on the detection and mitigation of attacks in cyberphysical systems with linear dynamics, e.g., see [2, 3] , are not applicable for the proposed secure trajectory planning problem, as the relevant robot dynamics are nonlinear due to (4) . In fact, as we show later in this paper and differently from the case of linear dynamics, detectability of the attack depends also on the control input u n employed by the trajectory planner.
We next formalize the notion of attack undetectability.
is undetectable if the measurements satisfy, at all times,
, and
and it is detectable otherwise.
Loosely speaking, an attack is undetectable if the measurements generated by the attacker are compatible with their nominal counterparts and with the robot dynamics at all times. On the other hand, if the conditions in Definition 2 are not satisfied, then the attack is readily detected by simple comparison between the nominal and actual measurements.
Finally, the objectives of an attacker and the secure trajectory planning problem can be jointly encoded into an optimization problem of the general form:
subject to: Dynamics (1) and (3),
where T ∈ R >0 represents the planning horizon, L :
is an integral cost, and V :
is a terminal cost that is chosen to penalize deviations between the nominal and attacked trajectories at the final time. In (5), the minimization over u n and T formalizes the trajectory planner goals (iii) and (iv). Conversely, the attacker objectives (i) and (ii) are captured by the outer maximization problem. The optimization problem (5) captures the general class of problems that can be solved with the framework proposed in this paper, and will be further specified and discussed in the following sections.
Remark 3 (Undetectability with GNSS sensor ) In scenarios where GNSS is the only sensor for detection, an adversary can deliberately alter the control input while remaining undetected. To see this, notice that the effect of any attack u can be canceled from the GNSS reading
Fig. 1. Nominal (blue) and undetectable attack (red) trajectories. At all times, the two trajectories have equal distance from the base station, and equal velocity components along the direction of the instantaneous position (green segments).
by selecting u GNSS = p n −p. Thus, secure trajectories for the considered attack model do not exist if the robot has no redundancy to combine with the GNSS readings.
Characterization of undetectable attacks
In this section we characterize the class of undetectable attacks and the resulting attacked trajectories. First, we establish a relationship between the nominal and attacked instantaneous position and velocity. Then, we derive an explicit expression of undetectable attacks, and demonstrate how an attacker can readily design attacks that escape detection. The following result relates attack trajectories with their nominal counterparts.
Lemma 4 (Undetectable trajectories) Let (u, u GNSS ) be an undetectable attack. Then,
PROOF. The first equality in the statement follows by substitution of (2) and (4) into Definition 2. Further, by taking the time-derivative on both sides of the equality p T p = p T n p n , and by using the assumption x n (0) = x(0), we obtain 2ṗ
T n p n at all times, from which the statement follows.
From Lemma 4, trajectories generated by undetectable attacks are characterized by two features: at all times, (i) the distance p T p between the attacked position and the RSSI-base station must equal the distance p T n p n in the nominal trajectory, and (ii) the component of the velocity v along the position p must equal the component of the nominal velocity v n along p n . These two geometric properties are illustrated in Fig. 1 . Next, we give an implicit characterization of undetectable attacks. 
PROOF. (Only if ) By substitution of (2) and (4) into Definition 2 we readily obtain p + u GNSS = p n , from which the second identity in the statement follows. To show the first identity, we note that for every undetectable attack u the identity y RSSI −y RSSI n = 0 holds. We then make explicit the dependence on the control input in the above identity by taking the second-order derivative with respect to time. This yieldsÿ RSSI −ÿ
from which (6) follows. We emphasize that the functionṡ
are piecewise continuous functions, since the signals y RSSI and y RSSI n are continuous and twice differentiable at all times. To see this, we combine the piecewise continuity assumption on u n and u with the dynamical equations (1) and (3), and note that the velocities v n and v and the positions p n and p are continuous and differentiable functions of time.
from which the first condition in Definition 2 follows. To prove RSSI undetectability, let u satisfy (6). Then,
from which we readily obtain the identityÿ RSSI −ÿ at all times, which implies undetectability of the attack u and concludes the proof.
Finally, we exploit Theorem 5 to give an explicit and comprehensive characterization of undetectable attacks.
Corollary 6 (Explicit characterization of undetectable attacks) The attack (u, u GNSS ) is undetectable if and only if it satisfies u = a r p + w and u GNSS = p n − p,
whenever p = 0, where w T p = 0 and
Corollary 6 provides a systematic way to design undetectable attacks using the nominal input u n . Further, the input w can be arbitrarily selected by the attacker and it does not affect detectability of the attack. Finally, it should be noticed that a r corresponds to the radial acceleration of the robot, that is, the projection of u along p, and that the attack input u is unconstrained when p = 0 (see also Theorem 5).
Design of optimal undetectable attacks
In this section we design undetectable attacks that introduce maximal deviations between the nominal and attacked trajectories. Assuming that the attacker knows the nominal control input, we address the optimal control problem
In the maximization problem (8), constraint (8a) corresponds to the attacked dynamics (3), while (8b)-(8c) enforce attack-undetectability and follow from Corollary 6. We next characterize the optimality conditions of the problem (8) . Let e i denote the i-th canonical vector of appropriate dimension, and let sgn( ) denote the sign function.
Theorem 7 (Attack optimality conditions) Let a r be as in (8c), and let w * be an optimal solution to (8). Then,
where
with boundary conditions
PROOF. To formalize the result, we make use of the fact that any undetectable attack (7) can be written in the form
where P = [e 1 e 2 0 0] ∈ R 2×4 , W = [−e 2 e 1 0 0] ∈ R 2×4 , and a t : R ≥0 → R. Following expression (9), the function a t represents the new design parameter in the optimization problem. To derive the optimality conditions for (8), we use the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle [23] , combined with the direct adjoining method for mixed state-input constraints [24] . We incorporate (8b) and (9) into (8a) and define the Hamiltonian
is a vector function of system costates, with the additional constraints
We then use (9) to rewrite the bound u ≤ u max as
and form the Lagrangian by adjoining the Hamiltonian with the considered state constraint:
where ν : [0, T ] → R is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the state constraint.
By application of the Maximum Principle [24] , the optimal control input a * t minimizes the Hamiltonian over the set U (x) = {a t : a (x, a t , λ, t) . This fact yields the optimal control law
Moreover, it follows from the Maximum Principle that there exists a vector function of system costates λ that satisfies the following system of equationṡ x = ∂L ∂λ ⇒ẋ = Ax + B(a r Px + a t Wx), where ∇ x a r denotes the gradient of a r with respect to x, and with boundary conditions
The statement of the theorem follows by substituting the expression of the gradient ∇ x a r = 2 p
From Theorem 7, optimal undetectable attacks can be computed by solving a two-point boundary value problem [25] . This class of problems is typically solved numerically, and it may lead to numerical difficulties for general cases [25] . To conclude this section and provide some intuition in the design of optimal undetectable attacks, we next present an example where optimal attacks can be characterized explicitly.
Example 8 (Undetectable trajectories for idle robots) Let p n (0) = [1 0]
T , v n (0) = 0, and u n = 0, so that the robot remains at position p n (0) at all times. Let u max = 1 and T = 5. Under these assumptions, the following control inputs satisfy the optimality conditions in Theorem 7:
where τ = 3.475, and ζ ∈ {−1, 1}. The control input (10) leads indeed to a circular motion around the origin, where at every time the radial acceleration is proportionally related to the square of the magnitude of the velocity. Notice that ζ = −1 and ζ = 1 achieve counterclockwise and clockwise motion, respectively. Moreover, (10) is an T at all times.
optimal solution to the optimization problem (8) since the deviation p(T ) − p n (T ) is maximized, as graphically illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Finally, we can explicitly derive a dynamical expression for the magnitude of the velocity vector n := v , that readsṅ = u 2 max − n 2 , where we substituted the expression for a r into a * t , and used the fact that n is independent of a r . To derive the value of τ , we seek for the time needed to steer n(t) from u max to a full stop, by letting n(0) = u max and n(τ ) = 0.
We show in Fig. 3 a set of simulations to illustrate the effects of optimal attacks when the nominal trajectory is the shortest path between the initial and the final position. In particular, the figure demonstrates that different levels of deviation can be achieved by undetectable attackers as the nominal input uses different ratios of the maximum allowable input u max .
Design of secure trajectories
In this section we address the secure trajectory planning problem. First, we characterize the existence of secure trajectories as a function of the initial and final configurations of the robot. Then, we formulate and solve an optimization problem to design control inputs that generate secure trajectories to reach a desired final configuration. We start with some necessary definitions. We say that a trajectory x n is secure if, independently of the attack u, one of the following mutually exclusive conditions is satisfied:
(C1) p = p n at all times; or (C2) if p = p n at some time, the attack u is detectable.
Similarly, a control input is secure if it generates a secure trajectory. We next characterize secure control inputs explicitly.
Theorem 9 (Secure control inputs) Let x n be the trajectory generated by u n . Then, u n is secure if and only if the following conditions hold simultaneously:
(1) there exists a function κ : R ≥0 → {−1, 1} satisfying
(2) the trajectory x n satisfies p n = 0 at all times.
PROOF. (If )
We assume (1)- (2) and show that either (C1) or (C2) is satisfied. We distinguish among two cases.
(Case 1) The attack (u, u GNSS ) does not satisfy the undetectability condition (6) . Then, (C2) follows. (Case 2) The attack (u, u GNSS ) satisfies the undetectability condition (6) . Under this assumption we now show that (1)- (2) imply (C1). We first consider the time instant τ = 0. By using the assumption x n (τ ) = x(τ ), which yields p n (τ ) = p(τ ) and v n (τ ) = v(τ ) , and by substituting into (6) we obtain the following undetectability condition valid at time τ :
By taking the 2-norm on both sides of the above equality, and by substituting the expression (11) we obtain
where we used the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Since exact equality must hold, the vectors u(τ ) and p(τ ) are linearly dependent and u(τ ) = u max , that is,
where γ(τ ) ∈ {−1, 1}. Finally, we note that γ(τ ) = κ(τ ) results in a violation of (12), and therefore u(τ ) = u n (τ ). As a result, p n (τ + ) = p(τ + ). To conclude the proof, we iterate the above reasoning for all τ ∈ [0, T ), from which (C1) follows.
(Only if ) We show that (C1)-(C2) imply (1)- (2) or, equivalently, if (1)-(2) do not simultaneously hold, then (C1)-(C2) are not satisfied. We distinguish two cases. (Case 1) Letū n be any control input that does not satisfy (11) . That is, there existst ∈ [0, T ], such that u n (t) = u n (t) for all t ∈ [0,t), andū n (t) = u n (t).
Letū be an attack input, withū =ā r p +w as in Corollary 6. We take the absolute value of (7) and use the relationship v n (t) = v(t) to obtain the inequality
where strict inequality follows from the assumption u n (t) = u n (t). As a result, any vectorw that satisfies ā r (τ )p(τ ) +w(τ ) = u max , is a nonzero undetectable attack that violates (C1) and (C2). (Case 2) There existst ∈ [0, T ], such that p n (t) = 0. It follows from (6) that whenever p n (t) = 0 any attack input is unconstrained at time instantt. As a result, any u with u(t) = u n (t) for all t ∈ [0,t) and u(t) = u n (t) is undetectable and violates (C1) and (C2).
Theorem 9 provides an explicit characterization of secure control inputs, and it shows that any secure control input has maximum magnitude u max at all times, and its direction is aligned with the direction of the positioning vector. We next show that any secure trajectory evolves on an invariant manifold of the state space that is uniquely defined by the initial state of the robot.
Lemma 10 (Invariant manifold of secure trajectories) Let x n be the trajectory generated by the secure control input u n . Then, x n ∈ S at all times, where
T denote the solution to (1) with initial condition x n (0), subject to control inputs that satisfy (1)-(2) in Theorem 9. To prove that x n ∈ S, we equivalently show that the quantity
where the last equality follows by substitution of (1).
Lemma 10 shows that secure trajectories are constrained to evolve on a manifold that is defined by the initial state of the robot, and it implies that only a subset of the state space can be reached via secure trajectories. These observations are illustrated in the next example.
T , wherex 1 ∈ R >0 andx 3 ∈ R. From Lemma 10,
and any secure trajectory satisfies x n ∈ S at all times. It should be observed, however, that secure trajectories may in fact be constrained on a strict subset of S. In fact, by combining the system dynamics (1) with the secure control input (11), we obtain
which defines a proper subset of S.
To determine a secure trajectory from the initial position p I with given velocity v I towards the final position p F , we consider the optimization problem
which aims to find a secure control input that minimizes a weighted combination of the distance to the desired final position and the time needed to reach such position. The following result characterizes the solutions to the optimization problem (13) .
Theorem 12 (Optimality conditions for secure control inputs) Let κ * and T * be an optimal solution to (13) . Then,
where ξ ∈ R >0 , x n , and λ satisfẏ
and
PROOF. To determine the unknown final time T we employ a technique similar to [26] and let t = ξτ , where ξ ∈ R >0 is a constant unknown parameter, and τ is the new temporal variable, with 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. We then use The Pontryagin's Maximum Principle [23] to derive the optimality conditions for the optimization problem (13), and consider the Hamiltonian
where λ is the vector function of system costates. By application of the Maximum Principle [23] , the optimal control input and corresponding trajectory satisfy the following optimality conditionṡ
with boundary conditions x n (0) = x 0 and λ(1) = ∂V ∂x (x(1)), where we used the fact 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. To derive an expression for the partial derivative of u n with respect to x n we let P = [e 1 e 2 0 0] ∈ R 2×4 and rewrite (11) as
Px n x T n P T P.
Hence, the expression for Φ(p n ) follows by substitution.
To determine the unknown final time, we consider the additional differential equationξ = 0, and let ξ be an unknown parameter. In particular, to determine the additional boundary condition we use the fact that the Hamiltonian is independent of time and the final time is free. Thus, the Hamiltonian is a first integral along optimal trajectories [23] , i.e., H(x n , κ, λ) = const., with H(x n , κ, λ)| t=0 = 0, which yield the claimed boundary conditions and the statement follows.
Theorem 12 allows us to compute secure control inputs by solving a two-point boundary value problem [25] . An illustration of minimum time and secure trajectories is presented in Fig. 4 and described in Table 1 . We note that secure trajectory require longer control horizons, but prevent the existence of undetectable attacks that deviate the robot from the nominal trajectory.
6 Undetectable attacks and secure trajectories for robots with unicycle dynamics
The goal of this section is to characterize undetectable attacks and secure trajectories for robots with unicycle Secure trajectory 3.84 0 Table 1 Details for minimum time and secure trajectories of Fig. 4. dynamics, so as to illustrate that the methods developed in this paper are applicable to a broad and general class of robot models. A robot with unicycle dynamics has one steerable drive wheel [27] , and is modeled through the dynamical equationṡ
2 denotes the robot position, θ n : R ≥0 → [0, 2π) denotes the steering angle, ν n : R ≥0 → R ≥0 and ω n : R ≥0 → R denote the wheel velocity and steering control, respectively. We assume that ν n differentiable, ω n is piecewise continuous, and that ν n ≤ ν max and |ω n | ≤ ω max , where ν max ∈ R >0 and ω max ∈ R >0 . Similarly to (3), we model the unicycle dynamics in the presence of attacks aṡ
where p = [p x p y ] : R ≥0 → R 2 and θ : R ≥0 → [0, 2π) denote, respectively, the position and steering angle of the robot under attack, while ν : R ≥0 → R ≥0 and φ n = 30
Fig . 5 . Nominal (blue) and undetectable attack (red) trajectories. As discussed in Theorem 13, the illustrated vectors satisfy ν cos(φ) = νn cos(φn) to guarantee undetectability.
ω : R ≥0 → R denote the attacked wheel velocity and steering control. As described in Section 2, we assume that the robot is equipped with a GNSS and an RSSI sensor, whose measurements are as in (2) in the absence of attacks, and as in (4) in the presence of attacks.
Using the notions in Definition 2, we next characterize undetectable attacks against robots with unicycle dynamics. In the remainder of this section, we let angle(v, w) denote the angle between the vectors v and w, that is
with angle(0, w) = angle(v, 0) = 0.
Theorem 13 (Undetectable attacks for unicycle dynamics) Let φ n = angle(p n ,ṗ n ) and φ = angle(p,ṗ). The attack (ν, ω, u GNSS ) is undetectable if and only if ν cos(φ) = ν n cos(φ n ), and u GNSS = p n − p.
PROOF. The proof follows by extending the proof of Theorem 5 to the considered unycicle dynamics.
The condition in Theorem 13 is illustrated in Fig. 5 . Next, we provide a characterization of secure control inputs for unicycle dynamics.
Theorem 14 (Secure control inputs for unicycle dynamics) Let p n and θ n be the trajectories generated by the control inputs ν n and ω n . Then, ν n and ω n are secure if and only if the following conditions hold simultaneously:
(1) θ n (0) = {0, π}, and p n = 0 at all times (2) ν n = ν max and ω n = 0 at all times.
(Case 1) The attack (ν, ω, u GNSS ) does not satisfy (15) . Then, (C2) immediately follows. (Case 2) The attack (ν, ω, u GNSS ) satisfies (15) . We first consider the time instant τ = 0, and derive the following bound by taking the absolute value of (15) , that holds at time instant τ :
where we used the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Since exact equality must hold, we obtain the following identities ν(τ ) = ν max , and φ(τ ) = φ n (τ ).
We observe that φ(τ ) = φ n (τ ) implies ω n (τ ) = 0 and, as a result, p n (τ + ) = p(τ + ). To conclude, we iterate the above reasoning for all τ ∈ [0, T ), from which condition (C1) follows.
(Only if ) We now show that (C1)-(C2) imply (1)- (2) or, equivalently, if (1)- (2) do not hold, then (C1)-(C2) are not verified. We distinguish among four cases.
(Case 1) The robot initial conditions are such that θ n (0) = {0, π}, and the nominal control inputs satisfy ν n = ν max and ω n (t) = 0 at all times. We consider the attack (ν, ω), witḣ ν = 1 cos φ ν nφn sin φ n − νφ sinφ , and ω = 0, and show that such attack is undetectable and violates (C1)-(C2). To prove undetectability, we use the fact that x n (0) = x(0), and equivalently show the identity between the time derivatives of (15), which yields −ν nφn sin φ n =ν cos φ − νφ sin φ, where we used the relationshipν n = 0 at all times. As a result, undetectability of the given attack (ν, ω) follows by substitution. To conclude, we observe that (ν, ω) is undetectable and violates (C1) and (C2).
(Case 2) There existst ∈ [0, T ] such that p n (t) = 0. It follows from (15) that, when p n (t) = 0, angle(0,ṗ n (t)) = 0. As a result, attack inputs are unconstrained at timē t, and any ω such that ω(t) = ω n (t) for all t ∈ [0,t), and ω(t) = ω n (t), is undetectable and violates (C1)-(C2).
(Case 3) Nominal control inputs satisfy ν n = ν max at all times, ω n (t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0,t), and ω n (t) = 0, t ∈ [0, T ]. We perform a change of variables [28] 
which leads to the following dynamical equationφ = sin φ p − ω that relates φ to the control inputs ν and ω (see [28] ). We then let ν = ν n at all times, and ω = ω n , if t ∈ [0,t), −ω n , if t ∈ [t, T ], from which we obtaiṅ φ = sin φ p − ω = − sin φ n p n + ω n = −φ n , for all t ∈ [t, T ]. By combining the above relationship with φ n (t) = φ(t) we obtain φ(t) = −φ n (t) for all t ∈ [t, T ]. To conclude, we note that the given choice of (ν, ω) leads to an undetectable attack that satisfies (15) and that violates (C1)-(C2).
(Case 4) Nominal control inputs satisfy ω n = 0 at all times, ν n (t) = ν max for all t ∈ [0,t), and ν n (t) < ν max , t ∈ [0, T ]. Under these assumptions, we consider the attack (ν, ω) with ν(t) = ν n (t) and ω(t) = ω n (t) for all t ∈ [0,t), anḋ ν = 1 cos φ ν n + νφ sin φ , and ω = 0, for all t ∈ [t, T ]. To prove undetectability of the considered attack, we observe that x n (t) = x(t), and equivalently show the identity between the time derivatives of (15) for all t ∈ (t, T ], which readṡ ν n =ν cos φ − νφ sin φ, where we used the relationships cos φ n = 1 and sin φ n = 0 at all times. As a result, undetectability of the given attack follows by substitution. To conclude, we note that (ν, ω) is undetectable and violates (C1) and (C2).
From Theorem 14, a secure trajectory exists only if initial and final position are aligned with the origin. This aspect of secure trajectories is consistent with similar conclusions previously drawn in Theorem 9 and Lemma 10.
Remark 15 (Generality of our methods) The approach presented in this work for the characterization of undetectable attacks and the resulting effects on the robot trajectories can be generalized to a wider class of nonlinear systems and attacks. The approach consists of three main steps, namely, the characterization of undetectable trajectories by studying the Lie derivatives of the measurement equations, the characterization of undetectable inputs and secure trajectories by solving a set of nonlinear algebraic equations akin to (6) and (15) , and the study of the submanifold of the state space that can be reached by undetectable attacks. While systematic tools may exist to solve the first two steps for a broad class of dynamics, the problem of nonlinear constrained controllability in the third step, which is solved in this paper via numerical optimization, requires the development of novel control theories and tools.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduce and study the problem of secure trajectory planning, that is, the design of trajectories to guarantee the motion between two desired configurations in the presence of attackers tampering with the measurements and inputs. We focus on the case where the robot has a GNSS sensor and a RSSI sensor, and provide an explicit characterization of secure trajectories, undetectable attacks, and their perturbation of the nominal trajectory. Further, we provide computational algorithms to compute secure trajectories and optimal attacks, and we illustrate our findings through a set of examples. To the best of our knowledge, this work constitutes a first step towards addressing security of systems with nonlinear dynamics. Several aspects are left as the subject of future investigation, including a characterization of the set of configurations reachable by undetectable attacks and secure trajectories, the extension of the methods to different classes of sensors and attacks, and the study of secure trajectories and undetectable attacks in the presence of sensing and actuation noise.
